BERRY v. CARTER.

the escape has been voluntary and the officer has been actuated by
fraud, malice or corruption: Hootman v. Shriner, 15 Ohio St. 43
(1864). In an action for an escape where the complaint is in the
nature of a declaration in an action of debt, 2 R. S. 437, § 63,
the defendant cannot show the insolvency of the debtor in mitigation: 4 Bosw. 884, 891; New York Sup. Ct., Afc Creery v.
Willett, 23 Howard Pr., affirming 4 Bosw. 643 to same effect
(1859); Benich v. Osler, Id. 884; Barnes v. Willett, 35 Barb.
514, s. c. 12 Abb. Pr. 448, affirming 11 Id. 225; 19 How. Pr.
564; N. Y. Common Pleas 1862, -Daguerrev. Orser, 15 Abb. Pr.
113, affirmed 10 Id. 12, note. This is so where the action is
founded on statutory liability imposed by code upon the sheriff
neglecting to justify after notice of exception: 9 How. Pr. 188; Abb.
Pr. 256 ; 1 Bos. & P. 450 ; 14 East 599 ; Metcaf v. Stryker, 31 N.
Y. 255, affirmed 31 Barb. 62; same more fully reported in 10 Abb.
Pr. 12; Bensel v. Lynch, 14 N. Y. 162, affirmed 2 Rob. 448;
compare Smith v. Knapp, 30 N. Y. 580; 2 Abb. N. Y. Dig.
783-788. In Louisiana, a sheiiff is only liable for actual damages
sustained: Bojel v. Bell, 15 La. Ann. 163. By 3 R. S., 5th ed..
853, § 21, if an actual loss or injury shall have been -produced
to any party, by the misconduct alleged, a fine shall be imposed
sufficient to indemnify such party, and to satisfy his costs and
expenses, which shall be paid over to him on the order of the
court. And in such case the payment and acceptance of such fine
shall be an absolute bar to any action, by such aggrieved party, to
recover damages for such injury or loss.
HuGH WE.IGHTMhAN.
NEW YoRK.
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Where several persons enter into a written contract, stipulating that each shall
keep up his own cattle, and prevent the sarne from trespassing upon or injuring
the crops or hedges of any of the others, for the period of three years, and that
in case any injury should occur by reason of the cattle of any one of said persons
trespassing upon the crops or hedges of any of the others, and in case the parties
themselves could not agree upon the amount of the damages sustained, then that
the question as to the amount of such damages should be submitted to arbitrators,
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consisting of three of the signers to said contract ; one of such arbitrators to be
selected by each of the parties, respectively, and the third one to be selected by
the other two arbitrators ; and that the decision of such arbitrators should be final
between the parties : Hield, that such contract is valid and binding.
And, in such a case, where the cattle of B. (one of the parties to said contract)
trespass upon the crops of C. (another of the parties to said contract), and injure
said cropq, and B., on the demand of C., refuses to pay any damages, and refuses
to recognli.e said contract as having any force or validity: Held, that C. may immediately, ani without offering to submit the question of damages to arbitrators,
commence an action against B. for the amount of such damages. B., by refusing
to recognise the validity of said contract, waives his right to have the amount
of said damages determined by arbitrators under the contract.
And, under said contract, it makes no difference, with reference to C.'s right
to recover, whether C.'s crops were fenced or not.
Where B.'s cattle trespass upon the crops of C. and C.'s cattle upon the crops
of B., these mutual trespasses do not in and of themselves rescind or destroy said
contract, or render any of its stipulations inoperative.
And where C.'s cattle trespass upon the crops of B., and B. does not claim that
his crops were fenced, or that C. drove his cattle onto said crops, or that B. was
willing or that C. was unwilling to submit the question of damages to arbitrators
under the contract : Held, that B. has no cause of action against C. for said
damages; that before B. can have a cause of action against C., in such a case, he
must be willing and C. unwilling to submit the question of damages to arbitrators
in accordance with said contract. -

Tiis action was commenced in a justice's court, and, after trial
and judgment, it was appealed to the District Court, where it was
again tried, and on such trial judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, Carter; and the defendant, Berry, as plaintiff in
error, then brought the case to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VALENTINE,

J.-The plaintiff below set forth in his bill of par-

ticulars two causes of action. We think there was no misjoinder
of such causes of action; but, even if there was, still, as the'question was not raised in the trial court, but is raised for the first tinme
in this court, we must hold that no error was committed by the
court below, in adjudicating upon both of said causes of action.
The first cause of actionwas founded upon a written instrument.
The plaintiff did not furnish a copy of said written instrument
with his bill of particulars, nor did he introduce either the original
or a copy thereof in evidence: But he alleged in his bill of particulars that the original was lost, and on the trial he sufficiently
proved its loss, and then proved the contents thereof by parol evidence. No objection was made in the court below to the introduction of said parol evidence, and hence, of' course, no error was
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committed in permitting it to go to the jury. Said written instrument was a contract, made and signed by the parties to this action
and by several other persons. It was in substance as follows:
Each signer was to keep up his own cattle, and prevent the same
from trespassing upon or injuring the crops or hedges of any one
of the other signers for the period of three years. But in case any
injury should occur within that time, by reason -ofthe cattle'of any
one signer trespassing upon the crops or hedges of any other signer,
and-in case the parties themselves could not agree upon the amount
of the damages sustained, then the question as to the amount of
such damages was to be submitted to arbitrators, consisting of three
of the signers to said written instrument-each party choosing one
of such arbitrators, and these two a third; and the decision of the
arbitrators was to be final between the parties. We know of no
reason why such a contract should not be valid and binding.
The defendant's cattle trespassed upon the plaintiff's wheat crop
and injured it. The wheat stood growing in a field around which
no fence or other lawful enclosure existed; but if said contract was
valid and binding, and we think it was, it made no difference
whether said field was fenced or not. The plaintiff, after driving
said cattle from his wheat field to the defendant's premises,
demanded of the defendant damages for the injuries which he (the
plaintiff) claimed that the cattle had committed and he had sustained. But the defendant refused to pay any damages, said that
he would not be bound by said contract, and that if the plaintiff
got anything out of him it would be by law. The defendant himself testified on the trial: "I told plaintiff that I had consulted
with attorneys with reference to said contract, and that I would
not r~cognise it, as othbrs had not recognised it."
. The plaintiff did not propose to appoint arbitrators under the
contract, and under the circumstances we do not think that he was
required to do so. It would have been an idle and useless ceremony to propose an arbitration under a contract which the defendant refused to recognise. The defendant, by refusing to recognise
the contract, waived his right to an arbitration, and at once gave
authority to the plaintiff to sue him for the damages which the
plaintiff had sustained, in any court having the requisite juris,diction.
'The defendant offered to prove on the trial that the plaintiff's
cattle had trespassed upon his crops, but the plaintiff objected, and
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the court sustained the objection. The defendant (plaintiff in.
error) now claims that this ruling of the court below was erroneous.
We do not think, however, that it was erroneous. The defendant
did not inform the court below for what purpose he offered to
introduce said evidence, and he had no bill of particulars or other
pleading on file (for he had filed none) from which his purpose
might be ascertained or inferred. But we would think said evidence
was incompetent for any purpose. It was certainly not sufficient
to show that the parties had by mutual consent rescinded said contract or waived its terms. The contract itself contemplated that
there would be trespasses, and provided a way for settling the
damages caused thereby. Each party had a right under the contract to recover damages for trespasses committed by the cattle of
the other party, and each party had a right to have these damages
determined in a particular manner. And neither party lost his
rights under the contract by permitting his cattle to trespass upon
the crops of the other party. Therefore, as mutual trespasses
would not of themselves and could not of themselves revoke or
destroy the contract, then said evidence could have been relevant
only for the purpose of establishing a counter-claim or set-off.
But it was not sufficient for that purpose. A counter-claim or setoff is necessarily a cause of action in and of itself and in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff, and a set-off 'must. be a
cause of action arising upon contract or ascertained by the decision
of a court. A trespass disconnected with contract could not be
the subject of set-off. But the defendant's evidence did not even
prove a cause of action of any kind. It did not prove or tend to
prove that the defendant's crops were fenced, or that the plaintiff
drove his cattle upon the defendant's crops; nor did it tend to
prove any other contract than the one we have already mentioned.
Now under that contract the defendant did not have eithpr counter-.
claim or set-off. Under that contract it was not only necessary that
the defendant's crops should have been injured by the plaintiff's
cattle, in order to give the defendant a cause of -action, but it was'
also necessary that the defendant should have -been ready and
willing to have his supposed damages adjudicated under the contract by arbitrators, and that plaintiff should have been unwilling
to have such damages so adjudicated. Now there is no pretence"
that the defendant was ever willing, or that the plaintiff was evri
unwilling, to submit any question of damages to arbitrators accordVOL. XXVI.- 62
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ing to said contract. Indeed, the defendant wholly ignored the
contract and refused to recognise it. This is shown by the testimony of the defendant himself while on the witness stand. If
the defendant has really sustained any damage by reason of the
plaintiff's cattle trespassing upon his crops or hedges, he may hereafter offer to submit the question of damages to arbitrators according to the contract, and then if the plaintiff refuse, the defendant
will have a cause of action against the plaintiff. But from the
evidence he has no such cause of action now.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
I It was decided in Ilochsterv. De La
Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, and in Frost v.
Knight, Law Rep. 7 Exeb. 11l, that an
action could be maintained upon an executory contract, before the time of fulfilment had arrived, where the defendant
had notified the plaintiff that he repudiated the contract. In the latter case
the defendant had promised to marry the
plaintiff upon his father's decease, but
subsequently told her that he did not
intend to do so. The suit was held to
have been well brought (for breach of
promise) during the lifetime of the
defendant's father. So in the present
case the notification by the defendant
that he would not be bound by the contract to arbitrate, was equivalent to an
appointment by the plaintiff of an arbitrator and a refusal by the defendant.
II. The question of whether the agreement to arbitrate in any particular case
amounts to a condition precedent to a
right of action, is one which the court,
especially in policies of insurance, is
frequently called on to decide.
(a) There is no doubt of the general
principle that " Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their
jurisdiction. That has been decided in
many cases."
Per Lord Chancellor
CRANWORTH, in Scott v. Avery, 5 11. of
L. Cases 846.
(b) I If two persons, whether in the
same or in a different deed from that
which creates the liability, agree to refer
the matter upon which the liability arises

to arbitration, that agreement does not
take away the right of action.
"But if the original agreement is not
simply to pay a sum of money, but that
a sum of money shall be paid if something else happens, ani that something
else is that a third person shall settle the
amount, then no cause of action arises
until the third person has so assessed the
same. For to say the contrary, would
be to give the party a different measure
or rate of compensation from that for
which he has bargained. This is plain
comnton sense, and is what the House
of Lords decided in Scott v. Avery,
supra." Opinion of BRAMWELL, B., in
Elliott v. Royal Exchange Assurance
Conipany, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 245.
Thus, where a lessee covenanted
with a lessor that he would keep
such a number only of hares an'l
rabbits as would do no injury to the
crops, otherwise to pay a fair and reasonable compensation, the amount of which,
in case of difference, was to be referred
to two arbitrators, it was held by the
Court of Appeal that tie covenant to
refer the amount of compensation was
collateral, and that the action was maintainable, though there had been no arbitrators: Dawson v. Lord Otho Fitzgerqld, 1 Exch. Div. 257, 260. In this
case JESSEL, M. R., stated the law to
be that a defence to an action of this kind
on the ground that no arbitration had
occurred, could only be made instwo
cases : "First, where the action can
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only be brought for the sum named by
the arbitrator. Secondly, where' it is
figreed that no action shall be brought
until there has been an arbitration, or
that arbitration shall be a condition precedent to the right of action. In all
other cases where thelce is, first, a covenant to pay, and, secondly, a covenant to refer, the covenants are distinct
and collateral, and the plaintiff may sue
on the first." Judgment for the plaintiff.
Two recent cases have gone very far
in denying the right Of a party to confer
a general right and then restrain its
complete exercise by a limitation of the
right of recourse by the other party to
the courts. In Insurance Co. v. Morse,
20 Wall. 445, a foreign insurance company had been allowed to do business
in Wisconsin under a statute requiring
an agreement by the company not to
remove any suit for trial into the United
States Courts. Held, that thke statute
and the agreement filed under it were
void. In Mentz v. Armenia Fire Ins.
Co., 79 Penn. St. 480, a suit was brought
on a policy of insurance providing, "In
case any difference or dispute shall arise
between the assured and this company
touching the amount of any loss or
damage sustained by him, such difference shall be submitted to the judgment
of arbitrators, one to be appointed by
each party, with power to select a third
in case of disagreement, whose decision
thereupon shall be final and conclusive ;
and no action, suit or proceedings at law
or in equity shall be maintained on this
policy, unless the amount of loss or damage
in case of difference or dispute shall be
flr'st thus ascertained."
No reference
having been shown the plaintiff was nonsuited, but the court above reversed this
judgment citing Ins. Co. v. Morse, supra,
holding that the agreement was a revocable, collateral covenant, merely subjecting the revoking party to an action
for damages for the revocation. "It is
not in the power of the parties thus to

oust the courts of their general jurisdiction, any more than they have to add to
it a personal covenant, that they are not
to be responsible for the breach of it."
Per Sit nSWOOD, J.
III. Revorability of reference before
awarddelivered.-If, therefore, a release
has been made, either formally, or by
the action of the parties, of existing
claims ; and a new liability, in consideration of such release, accrues by the
terms of the contract to the releasor, to
wit, such things as are determined in
his favor by a third party, after execution of such an agreement, the releasing
party cannot revoke and proceed upon
his original claim.
The reason of this is obvious. All
that remains after the execution of the
agreement is a new obligation, and the
agreement, if properly executed, by
which the original rights have been lost,
cannot be rescinded, because it is a conveyansce, and the original obligations
to the releasor have terminated and
passed out of existence by the act of
conveyance. Ills only right then is to
enforce from the other party the consideration provided in tile
contract. This
is the real explanation of that class of
cases in which it is said that a contract
cannot be revoked. The question then
is no longer one of ability to terminate
an agency, but of power to reinstate
one's self in stata quo after conveyance
made. Under this head may be included
the dicta of COULTER, J., in MrGhee-

hen v. Duffleld, 5 Barr 499, 500. There
-the plaintiff had discontinued a suit in
chancery, and substituted for it an amicable action of account render, all matters of controversy in which were referred to the decisiof of an arbitrator.
The term dicta is advisedly used, for the
decision in this case can be supported ott
other grounds. The arbitrator had actually made his award and filed his report in court. Afterwards, by the consent of both parties, tle matter was
referred back to correct certain mistakes
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upon the arbitrator's own application.
The court held that an attempted revocation upon the day when the second report was filed, a short time before filing,
was too late, and this was the opinion
of the Supreme Court. "The umpire
had heard the parties and made his
award before the defendant's act of revocation. This was too late, as a submission cannot be revoked after award.
The umpire produced his award in
court after full hearing of the parties,
and stated that he had made some mistakes which he wished to correct. The
court declined to send it back without
the consent of the parties, whereupon
the parties agreed. This remittitur of
the award to the umpire was the act of
the parties, but was not a new submission. The act of revocation by the defendants was therefore a nullity."
So, in- Paist v. Caldwell, 25 P. F.
Smith 166, "Two suits were pending.
* * * The parties agreed to consolidate
these actions and try them before referees, who should render a final award,
whether the defendant should pay anything, and if anything, how much, and
the sureties agreed to become responsible for the entire final sum, while the
defendant should be relieved from the
obligation to take any conveyance under
the contract of sale. Here valuable
rights were released and acquired on
each side." Per AGNEw, C. J.
Keeping in mind the difference between a termination of agency (which
a principal has always the power to
make, though he may be punished for
its improper exercise), and the power
to rescind a release or terminate an
agreement not depending upon agency
at all, let us pursue the subject further.
Where I agree that an obligation shall
arise on my part, which obligation shall.
be the finding against me of an arbitrator, this is not a question of agency at
all. No agency is delegated to the person who names the amount, and the test
of this is, that where no express autho-

rit. is given in the instrument to -such
arbitrator, the claim against me after
his finding is equally good. For the
finding of the arbitrator I might have
substituted any accidental event, such as
the falling of a tree, and it might be
with equal proprtety argued that I had
delegated an authority to the tree to fall
as a condition precedent to my liability,
and if that authority were revoked, my
liability did not arise. Such metaphysics as this are not listened to in a court
of law. Hence it is a misapprehension
on the part of the party to such a contract to suppose that he has any right
of revocation, and the cases which decide against such a view merely hold
that the principle is not one of agency
at all. Under this class fall Dawson v.
Fitzgerald, supra ; Monongahela Co. v.
Fenlon, 4 W. & S. 211. This wellknown case was similar to that of Scott
v. Avery, supra. The decision being not
that an agreement between the parties
can oust the jurisdiction of the court,
but that where the only liability upon
the contract is in respect to a sum found
due by an arbitrator, that finding must
be the basis of, and precedent condition
to, an action at law. In its absence it is
not that the liability has ceased, hut that
no liability has arisen. So in Snodgrass
v. Gavit, 4 Casey 221, in which it was
held that where there was an independent
stipulation to refer to arbitration, as in
Dawson v. Fitzgerald, supra, the plaintiff might recover upon the contract
without showing a reference.
. The principles above set forth
are
clearly stated in Johnson v. Andress, 5
Phila. 8, "that the parties had agreed
to make the submission a rule of
court would probably have made no difference, even if the rule had been entered of record before the authority of
the arbitrators was revoked ; as it was
not the mere agreement to enter, it was
at most an agreement that the authority
of the arbitrators should be irrevocable,
,which it has been repeatedly held will
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not prevent it from being revoked :
Toby v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 800823. Nor can the award be sustained
on the ground that the arbitrators had
agreed on what terms or principles the
award should be made, before the revocation was communicated to them. An
agreement to agree is obviously not a
final agreement, particularly when, as
here, it merely ascertains or fixes principles or data, and does not settle or arrive at conclusions or amounts. If an
award had been drawn up, as in Robinson v. Bickl!ey, 6 Casey 384, and signed
by two of the arbitrators under circumstances which obviated the necessity for
obtaining the signature of the third, a
subsequent revocation would no doubt
have been too late, but the arbitrators
may, and indeed always should, weigh
what they are doing until they actually
sign, and may undoubtedly, down to the
last moment before signing, refuse to put
their names to any decision which they
deem, on mature reflection, unjust, although all may have agreed to it as final
at their last meeting. On the ground,
then, that the exceptant was legally entitled to revoke the submission, and exercised that right in due season, we sustain the exe ptious which have been
filed, and set aside the award." Per
HARE, P. J.
In numerous decisions expressions of
opinion to the same effect may be met
with. Thus, in Keavy v. Sl3isler, 8 Philadelphia 54, LYND, J., says, "And yet
it cannot be denied that such power (i.
e., that a party after agreement that a
cause should be referred, and that there
should be no appeal, exceptions, or writ
of error, should have the power to revoke the agreement at any time before
making of the award, irrespective of the
time, trouble, and expense of the opposite parties and of the referees) was, and
is still, recognised in cases of reference
at common law, as well as references
under statute, where there is no suit
pending, or where the reference is not
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made a rule of court. The technical
sense which upholds this power does so
upon the ground that an agreement to
refer is, like any other agreement in
pals, violable by the parties, and the
party injured by such violation has his
remedy by action at law, as in other
cases of injura et damnum."
The language of the learned judge is
to the effect that the power to revoke exists where the reference is not made a
rule of court ; not that it only exists
where it is not agreed that the reference
shall be made a rule of court.
Again, in Power v. Power, 7 Watts
212, it was held by the Supreme Court,
GInsoN, C. J., delivering the opinion,
"That the submission to the determination of arbitrators, whether by deed, parol, or rule of court, like any other
naked authority, is countermandable
before execution of it, though expressed
to be irrevocable. It was so entirely
gone 'that the arbitrators could have
legally acted only by force of a fresh
delegation of authority."
And in Bailey v. Stewart, 3 W. & S.
560, it was again held that a submission
was annulled by the death of one of the
parties, and that the appearance before
the referees by the personal representatives of the deceased party, and trial of
the cause upon its merits, would not revive the agreement so as to charge a
surety on the arbitration bond.
So in Shisler v. Keavy, 25 P. F.
Smith 82, it was said, "while the
general power to revoke a submission is
well settled, yet after its execution it is
beyond the dominioji of either party."
The death of one of several plaintiffs
will not revoke the submission : 3 Halstead (N. J.) 119.
Death of a party to a submission of a
pending suit under a special statute expressly forbidding revocation without
the leave of court (p. 304), is not a
revocation of the submission : Moore v.
Webb, 6 Heiskell (Tenn.) 304, 305.
There can be no question that where
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the submission is simply by deed or
writing, and not by rules of court, and
conftrs a simple power of arbitrators to
act, the death of one of the parties
would be a revocation of the authority,
and any award made after this would be
a nullity. Per FREEMAN, J.
Bringing suit upon the subject-matter
referred was said in Pel~rs's Adm'r v.
Craig, 6 Dana (Ky.) 307, to be a revocation of the reference. In Loies v.
Kermtode, 8 Taunt. 146, the pendency
of an arbitration was incidentally held
not a reason for withdrawing the suit
from the jury, inasmuch as the 'court
held the question of whether an award
had been made a question for the jury
and allowed the case to go on.
1. After an award has been made a
court of equity will not.interfere by injunction to restrain its execution unless
equitable grounds are given therefor,
but will leave the parties to their
rights at law : Pope v. Lord Duncannon,
9 Simons 177. Here the vice-chancellor, though refusing an injunction,
expressly said that the authority to the
referees to fix the price was an authority
which the plaintiff might revoke at law,
"and as they have revoked it, the power of the arbitrators is completely destroyed at law." In other words, equity
wili not interfere to restrain the commi~sion of an illegal act, except for
equitable reasons, where there is ass
adeq~uate remedy at law.
2. It has also been held, under the
provisions of the statute in force in
England, that after an award has been
made, the mere fact that the submission
had not been made a rule of court gave
no jurisdiction to the court of chancery
to restrain the execution of the award ;
that the entire jurisdiction vested in the
court in which the submission had been
made a rule, though that was done after
the bill was filed : Nichols v. Rowe, 3
Mlyl. & K. 431. To the same effect are
Daris v. Getty, 1 Sim. & Stu. 411,
and Dawson v. Saddler, Id. 537. In
the last three cases the award had been

nade,.and the question was not one bf
power to revoke, but of jurisdiction.
3. It has also been held, that where a
rule of reference has been entered aecording to the provisions of the Act
of 1705 (Pennsylvania statute authorizing arbitrations to be made rules
of court), such rule cannot be discontinued without the consent of the court.
This proposition is evident. After an
executed submission to the jurisdiction
of the court, by a commencement of suit,
the party cannot withdraw without the
court's consent. Under this head may
be classed 1'ollock v. Hall, 4 Dall. 222,
s. c. 3 Yeates ; Oxley v. Olden, 1 Dall.
430; Rustom v. Dunwood!/, I Binn.
42 ; and in Bradly v. Wolff, 2 Yeates
343, a rule of reference was, for proper
grounds, by. permission of the court,
allowed to be discontinued. So in Ferris v. Mann, 2 Zabriskie (N. J.) 161.
Carey v. Commissioners of Mfontgomery
Count~y, 19 Ohio 281, was expressly decided under the Ohio statute, admittedly
different (p. 281) from the commonlaw right of revocation. So where the
record of the court showed a revocation
and delivery upon the same day, but did
not indicate priority, the Supreme Court
will not disturb the decision of the
court below : Shisler v. Keavy, 25P. F.
Smith 82. In that case the record also
showed that the notiqe of revocation was
given to one only of the referees, and
there was no evidence that this notice
had been communicated to either of the

others. This ground alone would have
been fatal to the power to revoke.
Where the award has been delivered
and filed, and is re-referred to the arbitrator for the correction of a mistake by
t of the
arties upon
m is oy
consent of the parties upon his own
motion, the power to revoke no longer
exists : ffcGeehen v. Duffleld, supra.
The agency has ceased upon the filing
of the award. The arbitrator, upon a
re-reference, becomes an officer of the
court, like a master, or examiner, and
his authority is not derived from, al-
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though supported by, the consent of the

Tlonts, 6 Binn. 337 ; Painter v. Kiss-

parties.
There is another large class of cases
in which it has been held that a delivered
award will not be set aside by the
court, unless for proper reasons, and
that the court above will, in such cases,
only look at the record, and, unless it
discloses error, affirm the judgment
below. Under this head may be classed
Rogers v. Plalford, 2 Jones 184 ; Buck-

ler, 9 P. F. Smith 331 ; Dickerson v.
Rorke, 6 Casey 380; Robinson v. Biclley, Id. 389. In several of these last
cases, it was also decided that an agreement to refer need not contain an agreement to make the submission a rule
of court, the latter being implied from
the agreement itself. See Hlustn v.
Clark et al., 35 Leg. Intel. (lhila.)
A. SYDNEY BiDDLE.
48.

man v. Davis, 4 Casey 214 ; Massey v.

Supreme Court of Mllissouri.
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A forcible entry of a claimant into the possession of the premises sued for does
not have the effect of suspending the operation of the Statute of Limitations in
favor of an adverse claimant; and when restitution is made by law, the period
during which the forcible possession was held by the owner will be added to and
become a part of the adverse possession of such adverse claimant.

THIS was an action of ejectment, instituted May 1st 1872, for
military bounty lands lying in the county of Chariton, Missouri.

The plaintiff had judgment in the action.

The plaintiff and the de-

fendant claimed through a common source of title. The plaintiff
claimed title under a deed from the common grantor, dated March
11th 1822, executed in the state of Tennessee, and recorded in

Chariton county April 2d 1842.

This deed, when recorded, was

Plaintiff connected him.self
neither proven nor acknowledged.
with this conveyance by a regular chain of title-papers., all of which

were recorded April 2d 1842, except the deed to himself. which
was recorded June 19th 1848. The defendant claimed under a
deed executed by the common grantor November 17th 1821, with
which he connected himself by a regular chain of conveyances, all
of which were recorded March 20th 1868. The defendant also
relied on the limitation of two years, applicable to suits for military

bounty lands, and proved the following facts:"That in the month of October 1868 one Krassig took the possession of the land sued for and built a house on it: that shortly
afterwards, and about the time the house was completed, the plaintiff took forcible possession of the house and put his tenants in it;
that Krassig took the possession and built the house under a con-
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tract for the purchase of the land, mide with one Lucius Salisbury,.
'who is one of the grantors in defendant's chain of title; that some
months after plaintiff took the possession of the premises from said
Krassig, the said Krassig commenced suit against the tenants
of said plaintiff, and on the 8th day of February 1869 recovered
judgment in forcible entry and detainer against them for said land,
before a justice of the peace; that a writ of restitution was issued
on said judgment, and was placed in the hands of the proper constable, who, on the 29th day of March 1869, executed the same by
putting the said Krassig in possession of the said premises; that
on the said day the sale of said land by Salisbury to said Krassig
was annulled, and the said Salisbury took the land back from
Krassig; that on the said day the said Salisbury rented said premises to one Freeman, who went into the possession thereof, and
remained until about the 1st day of March 1870; that about said
time the plaintiff again took forcible possession of said premises,
and put his tenants on the same; that on the 14th day of April
1870 the said Salisbury commenced a suit for forcibly entry and
detainer against Stephen Wilson et al., who were the tenants
of plaintiff, before a justice of the peace, and on the 8th day
of September 1870 recovered judgment for the possession of said
premises; that defendants appealed from said judgment to the
Circuit Court of Chariton county, Missouri, where, on the 28d day
of May 1871, the said Salisbury again recovered judgment for the
possession of said premises, and on the 10th day of.July 1871 was
put in the possession of said premises by a writ of restitution,
issued on said judgment; and that said Salisbury and his grantee,
Thomas, one of the defendants in this case, by"themselves and
tenants, have ever since held the possession of said premises, and
made valuable improvements thereon."
It was admitted by the defendants, at the instance of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff commenced an action of ejectment, for the
land in suit, in the Chariton Court of Common Pleas, a court of
competent jurisdiction, against the tenants of Salisbury, September
1st 1871, which was continued until April 2d 1872, when plaintiff
suffered a nonsuit and commenced this action May 1st 1872:
Sections 35 to 38 inclusive, of chapter 109 of the General Statutesin relation to conveyances, first enacted in 1843, provide that every
instrument of writing executed out of this state and within the
United States, which conveys or affects military bounty lands in
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this state, and which is acknowledged or proved according to the
laws and usages of the place whIre executed, which has been filed
for record and recorded in the proper office, although such filing or
recording may not have been in accordance with any law in force,
shall impart the same notice as if the acknowledgment or proof had
been made in accordance with law; and that certified copies of the
said instruments, or of the record thereof, shall, upon proof of the
loss or destruction of th6 original instrument, be read in evidence
with like effect and on the same conditions as the original instrument.
By the 35th section of chapter 143 of the General Statutes in
relation to evidence, first enacted February 2d 1847, it is provided
that the records made by the recorder of the proper county, by
copying from any deed of conveyance, that has neither been proven
nor acknowledged, or which has b.een proven or acknowledged, but
not in accordance with the law in force at the time the same was
done, shall impart notice to all persons of the contents of such
instruments, and all subsequent purchasers and mortgagors shall
be deemed to purchase with notice thereof.
Maters

"Winslow, for appellants.

George

. .Easley and if. Lander, for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HouGJi, J.-In Jrisp~en v. .Hannavan,50 Mfo. 416, it was said
that the 35th. section of the chapter in relation to evidence, was
not applicable to the military bounty lands; but the remarks of the
judge who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, must be
construed with reference to the character of the conveyances then
under consideration. Those conveyances were executed out of the
state, and were acknowledged before a notary public, one in the
District of Columbia and the other in the state of Kentucky, and
the court held that their admissibility as evidence was to be determined by reference alone to the 35th, 36th and 87th sections of
the statute of conveyances, relating to military bounty lands ; and
as there was no testimony showing that at the date of their execution a notary public was authorized to take the proof or acknowledgment thereof, either in the District of Columbia or in the state
of Kentucky, they were properly excluded. Of course they could
not have been admitted, in any court, under the 35th and 36th
VOL. XXVL-63
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sections of the chapter on evidence, until it was shown that they
had not been acknowledged or proven according to law. The laws
of the several states are to be proven like other facts, and there
was no evidence on that subject.
It was obviously not intended to declare that the 35th section of
the chapter on evidence, can in no case be held to include conveyances of military bounty lands. Conveyances executed within this
state, for instance, which are neither proven nor .acknowledged,
would be covered by this section, whether they passed the title to"
military bounty lands or other lands; and if neither proven nor
acknowledged we can perceive no good reason why they should. not
be held to be included within the provisions of this section, although
executed outside of this state.
Those conveyances only are excluded from the operation of the
85th section of the statute on evidence, which are included in the
35th section of the statute orkcofiveyances; and those included in
the latter section are such only as have been executed and acknowledged out of this state, and within the United States according to
the law of the place where executed: Tully v. Canfield, 60 lMo.
That such was the law prior to the passage of the Act of March
22d 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 44) is shown by the opinion of this court in
Totten. v. James, 55 Mo. 494, wherein the Act of 1873 was declared
to be but a legislative interpretation of sections 35 and 36 of the statute on evidence. That Act of Assembly added nothing in reality
to the scope and efficacy of those provisions, and was doubtless
prompted by the gbneral character of the remarks made in &ispen
v. Han .avan, which was decided in 1872. As the deed from McKean to Casey was neither proven nor acknowledged at the time it
was recorded, April 2d 1842, it clearly comes within the provisions
of the 35th section of the statute on evidence, and consequently
affected all subsequent purchasers with notice from the 2d February 1847. We are of opinion, therefore, that the paper title of the
plaintiff is the better title. This being the case, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover, unless the defendants have shown an adverse
possession for the period of two years.
The plaintiff contends that his entry and possession thereunder
in 1868, and his subsequent entry and possession in 1870, destroyed
the continuity of the defendant's possession and interrupted the
operation of the statute.
It may well be doubted whether the common-law right of entry,
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though apparently recognised in the second section of our Statuto
of Limitations, has any existence in this state; if it has, it is certainly of no practical importance. Whether the construction, therefore, which has been given to our statute of foreible entry and detainer, which was enacted before the adoption of the common law
by us, is such as to make all common-law entries unlawful, need not
now be determined, as under our statute no entry can be held to
be sufficient or valid as a claim, unless suit be commenced thereon
within one year after making such entry, and within the time limited for bringing an action of ejectment. The plaintiff's entries
in the present case can, consequently, avail him nothing, even if
they could be considered as common-law entries, inasmuch as nosuit was commenced by him thereon within qne year after they
were made. Besides, the entries proven to have been made by the
plaintiff, were not, in their character, such as were recognised at
common law, as they were made with force and strong hand. Such
entries are not only in violatuon of our forcible entry and detainer
law, but they were prohibited by the. British statutes in force prior
to the fourth year of James the First. "The remedy by entry,"
says Blackstone, "must be pursued according to statute 5 Ric.
2, stat. 1, c. 8, in a peaceable and easy manner, and not with force
and strong hand. For if one turns and keeps another out of possession forcibly, this is an injury of both a civil and a criminal
nature. The civil is remedied by immediate restitution, which puts
the ancient possessor in statu quo :" 2 Com. 179.
A rule which would allow the owner of land to arrest the operation of the Statute of Limitations by a forcible intrusion upon
the peaceable possession of an adverse occupant, and his expulsion
from the premises, would be followed by the most pernicious consequences. Violence and disorder would speedily ensue, and for the
peaceful methods of the law would be substituted the hostile conflicts of opposing claimants. If the owner of land wrest the possession by force from the adverse occupant, when restitution is made
by law, the period during which the forcible possession was held
by the owner will be added to, and become a part of, the adverse
possession of such occupant: Robinson v. Walker, 50 Mo. 19;
Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283.
It follows from the foregoing views, that the forcible intrusion
of the plaintiff into the possession of the premises sued for, did
not suspend the operation of the Statute of Limitations, and on the
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adverse possession shown by the defendant he was entitled to a verdict. The judgment will be. reversed and the cause remanded.
The question decided in the above
reported case is one of unusual interest
and importance. Without deciding that
there is no such thing in Missouri as a
common-law entry which would suspend
the operation of the Statute of Limitations, the court holds that a forcible entry would not have that effect. We cannot consider the reasoning by which this
conclusion is reached as altogether satisfactory. An entry at common law did not
have the effect of ousting the occupant.
There was no particular form required.
The purpose of it was to give notice
of the claim of the person making the
same, and the effect of it was to suspend the running of the statute. Why
would not a forcible entry have this
effect as well as a peaceable one ? The
answer of the court is, because a forcible
entry is an injury of both a civil and
criminal nature, the civil injury being remedied by immediate restitution,
which puts the ancient possessor in statu
quo. This is undoubtedly the true rule
as regards the actual possession; but
after the owner has been punished by
being turned out of possession, what

good reason is there for denying him
the benefits of a common-law entry,
which may be said to be embraced in a
forcible entry ? In other words,, if a
mere naked entry would suspend the
operation of the statute, why would a
forcible retention of possession annul
the effect of such entry 7 Why should
the greater exclude the lesser? It is
said by the court that to allow a forcible
entry to suspend the operation of the
statute would be to encourage violence
and disorder. This would be the case,
provided there be no common-law entry
which would have this effect; but if
there be such common-law entry, then
the pursuit of the same, instead of resorting to a forcible entry, is sufficiently sanctioned by the consideration
that the latter is punishable by restitution of the premises. This view, however, would not change the result in
this particular case, in view of the fact
that suit was not brought in one year
after the entry was made, as required
statute.
H. B. JoHNsoN.
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Time is usually of the essence of an executory contradt for the sale and subsequent delivery of goods, where no right of property in the same passes by the
bargain from the vendor to the purchaser.
Whether one promise be thp consideration for another, or whether the performance and not the mere promise be the consideration, is to be determined by the
intention anAl meaning of the parties, as collected from the instrument ant the
application of good sense and right reason to each particular case.
Where an act is to be performed by the plaintiff before the accruing of the defendant's liability under his contract, the plaintiff must prove either his performance
of such condition precedent or an offer to perform it which the defendant rejected,
or his readiness to fulfil the condition until the defendant discharged him from
so doing or prevented the execution of the matter Which the contract required him
to perform.
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Impossible conditions cannot be performed, and if a person contracts to do what
at the time is absolutely impossible the contract will not bind him, because no man
can be obliged to perform an impo*ibility ; but where the contract is to do a thing
which is possible in itself, the performance is not excused by the occurrence of an
inevitable accident or other contingency, although it was not foreseen by the party,
nor was within his control.
APPEAL

from the Court of Claims.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Time is usually of the essence of an executory
contract for the sale and subsequent delivery of goods, where no
right of property in the same passes by the bargain from the vendor
to the purchaser, and the rule in such a case is that the purchaser
is not bound to accept and pay for the goods unless the same are
delivered or tendered on the day specified in the contract: Addison
on Cont., 6th ed., 185; Gath v. Lees, 3 Hurlst. & C. 558; Coddington v. Paleologo, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 196.
Articles of agreement were made June 1st 1864; between the
assistant quartermaster of the army and the petitioner, who contracted to manufacture and deliver at the clothing depot of the
army in Cincinnati, by or before the 15th of December then next,
two hundred thousand yards of dark-blueuniform cloth, and it was
agreed that deliveries under the contract should be made as follows:
Five thousand yards in June; twenty-five thousand yards in July;
twenty-five thousand yards in August; thirty-five thousand yards
in September; fifty thousand yards in October; fifty thousand yards
in November, and ten thousand yards on or before the 15th of
December in the same year.
Other persons were interested with him in the contract at the
time it was made, but one after another retired until the petitioner
is the only one that retains any interest. His claim is fully set
forth in his petition.
Certain instalments of the cloth were delivered, for which the
United States paid the contract price, excepting ten per cent.,
reserved by the United States, pursuant to the written contract.
Neither party complains of any default prior to August of that
year, when the mill in which the cloths were manufactured was
destroyed by fire, and the petitioner, in consequence of the
loss, failed to make the deliveries of the cloth as the contract
required, and the assistant quartermaster called his attention to the
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fact, and notified the sureties that he should 'proceed against their
principal for his delinquency.
Unable to fulfil tho terms of the contract, he applied by letter
to the person in charge of the depot to be released from the obligation and for the payment of the reserved ten per cent. Being
unsuccessful in that application, he visited Washington for the
purpose of applying to the department to be released from the
unfinished part of his contract, and with that view sought an interview with the quartermaster-geixeral, who referred him to the head
of the bureau of clothing, where he was told that there was no
power out of Congress to release him, and that he must furnish
the goods. Hadithe conversation between the parties stopped there
the case would be destitute of any color of equity, but the finding
of the court below shows that the head of the bureau remarked that
upon application to the assistant quartermaster sufficient time would
be allowed to deliver the goods.
Though told that there was no power out of Congress to release
him from his contract, he procured the necessary quantity of such
cloth to be manufactured, and applied by letter to the assistant
quartermaster for leave to complete the contract, who referred the
letter to the quArtermaster-general for decision, and his reply to
the petitioner, as given in the findings, was that he could not
authorize the release from contracts nor the extension of time for
the delivery of articles under a contract, nor any action whatever
not in accordance with their terms and conditions.
Prices in the market fell one-half, but the petitioner tendered the
cloths to the assistant quartermaster, who, refused to receive the
same because the time for deliveries nuder the coniract had passed.
Damages are claimed by the petitioner upon the ground that the
time for the delivery of the cloths as specified in the contract was
extended, but the Court of Claims decided that the theory of fact
involved in the defence was not proved; that the remarks of the
head of the bureau of blothing were not sufficient to support that
theory, as they might not imply anything more than the opinion
of that officer as to what the assistant' quartermaster would do.
Due appeal was taken by the petitioner, and he assigns the following errors: I. That the court erred in holding that time was
of the etsence'of the written contract. 2. That the court erred in
deciding that there was not a valid extension as to the time for
delivering the cloths. 3. That the court erred in overruling the
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proposition of the petitioner that the United States were estopped
from denying the existence of the contract when the goods were
tendered. 4. That the court erred in holding that there was not
a new contract, and that such new contract was void because not in
writing.
Whether one promise be the consideration for another, or
whether the performance and not the mere promise be the consideration, is to be determined by the intention rind meaning of the
parties, as collected from the instrument and the application of good
sense and right reason to each particular case. Instructive rules
for the accomplishment of that purpose have been stated in various
decisions of the court and in treatises of high authority, some few
of which may be consulted in this case to advantage: Chit. Con.,
10th ed., 668.
Where an act is to be performed by the plaintiff before the accruing of the defendant's liability under his contract, the plaintiff must
prove either his performance of such condition precedent or an offer
to perform it which the defendant rejected, or his readiness to fulfil
the condition until the defendant discharged him from so doing or
prevented the execution of the matter which the contract required
him to perform. For where the right to demand the performance
of a certain act depends on the execution by the ffromisce of a condition precedent or prior act, it is clear that the readiness and offer
of the latter to fulfil the condition and the hindrance of its performance by the promisor, are in law equivalent to the completion of the
condition precedent, and will render the promisor liable upon his
contract: Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 716; Morton v. Lamb, 7
Term Rep. 125; 2 Wins. Saund. 352, b; 2 Smith's Lead. Cases,
7th Am. ed., 13.
Well-considered authorities everywhere agree that a contract may
be so framed that the promises upon one side may be dependent
upon the promises upon the other, so that no action can be maintained founded on the written contract without showing that the
plaintiff has performed or at least has been ready, if allowed by the
other party, to perform his own stipulations, which are a condition
precedent to his right of action; nor is it necessary to enter into
much discussion in this ease to prove that the described instalments
of clothing were required, by the true intent and meaning of the
parties, as expressed in the written contract, to be delivered at the
time and place therein specified and set forth, as the minifest pur-
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pose and object of the contract was to procure necessary supplies
of clothing for an army in the field.
None will pretend that any right of property in the clothing
passed to the United States by the bargain between the parties, and
the rule in such cases is that time is and will be of the essence of
the contract, so long as the contract remains executory, and that
the purchaser will not be bound to accept and pay for the goods if
they are not delivered or tendered on the day specified in the contract: Addison on Contracts, 6th ed., 185.
Suppose that is so, still it is contended by the petitioner that the
time of performance was extended by the remarks of the head of
the bureau of clothing when the contractor applied to be released
from the obligation to complete the unfinished part of his contract,
but the court is unable to concur in that proposition. The finding
of the court below shows that no such extension was ever made.
Conditions precedent may doubtless be waived by the party in
whose favor they are made, but the findings of the court below do
not afford any ground to support any such theory. Cases arise
where either party, in case of a breach of the contract, may be compensated in damages, and in such cases it is usually held that the
conditions are mutual and independent, but where the conditions
are dependent anid of the essence of the contract, it is everywhere
held that the performance of one depends on the performance of
another, in which case the rule is universal that until the prior condition is performed the other party is not liable to an action on the
contract: Addison on Contracts, 6th ea., 925. Where time is of
the essence of the contract there can be no recovery at law in case
of failure to perform within the time stipulated: Sater v. E_.mer8on, 19 How. 224. Additional authorities to show that a party
bound to perform a condition precedent cannot sue-on the contract
without proof that he has performed that condition are scarcely
nedessary, as the principle has become elementary: Governeur v.
Tllot8on, 3 Edw. Ch. 348. Conditions, says STORY, may be either
precedent or subsequent, but a condition precedent is one which
must happen before either party becomes bound by the contract.
Thus if a.person agrees to purchase a cargo of a certain ship at sea,
provided the cargo proves to be of a particular quality, or provided
the ship arrives before a certain time or at a particular port, ea~h
proviso is a condition precedent to the performance of such a contract, and unless the cargo proves to be of the stipulated quality or
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the ship arrives within the agreed time or at the specified port, no
contract can possibly arise: Story on Contracts, 5th ed., 33.
Impossible conditions cannot be performed, and if a person contracts to (1o what at the time is absolutely impossible, the contract
will not bind him, because no man can be obliged to perform an
impossibility, but where the contract is to do a tiling which is possible in itself, the performance is not excused by the occurrence of
an inevitable accident or other contingency, although it was not
foreseen by the party, nor was within his control: Chitty on
Contracts, 10th ed., 663; Jervis v. Tonpkinson, 1 Ilurlst. &
Nor. 208.
Other defences failing, the petitioner insists that the United
States are estopped to deny that the time of performance was extended, as set up in his second assignment of error, but the court
is unable to sustain that proposition, as tile remark of tile head of
the bureau does not amount to a contract for such an extension,
being nothing more than the expression of an opinion that the
assistant quartermaster would grar the applicant some indulgence.
Viewed in that light, it is clear that the United States did not do
anything to warrant the contractor in changing his position, and if
not, then it is settled law that the principle of estoppel does not
apply: Packard v. Sears, 8 Ad. & E. 474; Freeman v. Cook, 2
Exch. 654; Poster v. Dawber, 6 Id. 854; Edwards v. hapman,
1 Mees. & Wels. 231 ; Swan v. Seamons, 9 Wall. 274. Estoppel
does not arise in such a case unless the party for whom the service
is to be performed induced the other party by some means to change
his position and act to his prejudice in consequence of the inducement, but in the case before the court the remark made by the head
of the bureau was not of a character to warrant the petitioner to
assume that it was agreed that any such indulgence would be given:
Benjamin on Sales, 2d ed., 45; United States v. Shaw, 1 Cliff.
310.
Conclusive evidence that the time of performance had expired is
found in the findings of the court, and the petitioner failing to establish his theory that the time of performance had been extended,
it is clear that there is no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.
VbL. XXVI. -64
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Court, of Appeals of New York.
APPELLANT, v. TIE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN &
HARTFORD RAILROAD CO., RESPONDENTS.

JASON WEEKS,

The contract of a carrier of passengers implied from the purchase of a ticket, in
the ordinary course of business, is to carry the purchaser safely, as to his person
and his ordinary baggage, clothing, articles of personal convenience and ornament, and money for personal expenses.
:For injuries to his person or loss of his property of the foregoing kind, by the
negligence of the carrier, the latter is responsible in damages, although the injury
or loss occurred by the violence of third persons, not under the carrier's control.
A carrier is bound to exercise the utmost vigilance to protect his passengers from
violence as well as from accident.
But where the passenger carries on his person property not included in the class
mentioned, and which, from its value, could not be expected to form part of ordinary travelling baggage, the carrier is not liable for its loss even by forcible robbery allowed to take place by the carrier's negligence. If the carrier could be
made responsible for such property at all, it would be upon specific delivery into
its charge and the payment of a compensation reasonably proportioned to the
amount of risk incurred.
A railroad train having stopped in * outskirts of New York about dusk, and
there being broken up so that the cars might be separately hauled by horses into
the depot, several strangers entered one of the cars being so drawn and forcibly
robbed a passenger of $16,000 in bonds, which he had on his person : Hed, that
he could not recover the value of the bonds.
Where, upon such an occurrence, the passenger brought suit, claiming the value
of the stolen bonds, and the case was tried upon that issue, the plaintiff should
have been nonsuited, although incidentally the violence done to his person was put
iu'evidence. That cause of action not being specifically put forward and appearing only as an incident to the other claim, was not enough to carry the case to
the joufy. APPELLANT brought an action in the Supreme Court against the
respondent for negligence. The facts as declared upon and shown
at the trial were that plaintiff took passage at BangoriMe.,'where
he lived, for Quincy, Ill., having a through ticket, covering the
line of defendants' railroad.
On the arrival of the train at Forty-second street, New York, it
was stopped, broken ul, and the cars, two-by-two, were drawn to
the Twenty-seventh street depot, in Fourth avenue, by horses.
On arriving near the depot, the two cars-in the rear one of
which was the plaintiff-were detached, there being room for only
one car to enter the depot at a time, and the forward car was drawn
by the horses into the depot, leaving the rear one of the two cars
standing alone in the avenue, without any horse attached, without
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any conductor, brakeman, or other employee of the company upon
it, and wholly unprotected.
The plaintiff was in this rear car, and besides him there only remained in it some six or eight passengers, mostly women, one "oldish gentleman ;" most of the passengers having left the car either
at Forty-second street, or as it stopped in Fourth avenue, near the
depot, probably to go to their homes in the city. This wais about
dark-the street lamps being lit. The plaintiff, becoming somewhat
impatient at the delay, and fearing for his connection with the western train, arose from his seat, about midway of*the car, and proceeded towards the front. As he approached it, several men, not
passengers, who had entered the car, seized him, knocked his hatdown over his eyes, backed him over upon the stove, held him, took
from his inner breast coat pocket certain United States 5-20 and
other bonds of the value of $16,000, and escaped with them, before
any of the passengers or the police arrived to his assistance.
The defendants denied their liability for the loss of the bonds on
the ground that no delivery had been made to them and they had
undertaken no duty in regard to the bonds. They also relied on
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in carrying property of
that kind and of such value in such manner.
The case was left to the jury with instructions that they 'night
find for plaintiff if they believ6d the loss occurred through the
negligence of defendants without any contributory negligence on
his own part. The jury found for plaintiff for $16,685.47.
The defendants asked instructions to the jury that under the- facts
as proved plaintiff was not entitled to recover, which being refused
defendants excepted, and on exception the court at General Term
set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. From this order
plaintiff appealed to this court.
B. F. .audgett and L. B. Marsh, for appellant, on the point
that defendants were liable for negligence in protecting the person
and property of plaintiff, cited Pittsburgh, &c., Railroad Co. v.
.Hinds, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 14; Punt v. Norwilh J- N. i .
Trans. Co., 6 Blatch. 0. C. 158; 84 Conn. 554; Putnam v.
Seventh Avenue Railroad Co., 55 N. Y. 108; Pittsburgh, sc.,
Railroad Co. v. Pillow, 76 Penn. St. 510.
. G. Child,for respondents.-l. Defendant is not liable except
for baggage: Dexter v. S. B. Railroad Co., 42 N. Y. 326 ; Orange

508 '

WEEKS v. N. Y., N. H. & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO.

County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 85; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62
N. Y. 85; Merrill v. Grinnell, 80 Id. 594; Jordanv. FallRiver
Railroad Co., 5 Cush. 69; Dunlap v. Int. Steam Co., 98 Mass.
371; Smrith v. B. & M. Railroad Co., 44 N. H. 825; C. & C.
Railroad Co. v. Marcus, 38 Il. 219; Abbott v. Bradstreet, 55
Me. 530; ificock v. .raug. Railroad Co., 81. Conn. 281; F'irst
Nat. Bank v. I. & C. R ailroad Co., 20 Ohio St. 259; L ahill v.
N. W. Railway Co., 19 C. B. N. S. 818 ; Macrow v. G. W. Railway Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612.
2. Defendant is not liable for loss of property. retained in the
exclusive possession of the passenger: -ruloffv. Cent. RailroadCo.,
10 Blatch. 16; Grosvenor v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 39 N.
Y. 34; Cohen v. Frost,2 Duer 835; Tower v. U. & S. Railroad Co.,
7 Hill 47; Doyle v. Kiser, 6 Ind. 242; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Geo.
217; Hannibal Railroad Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. 262; Talley v.
Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 C. P. 44.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOLGER, J.-The questions in the case arise upon a motion to
dismiss the complaint. The grounds of the motion ate somewhat
generally expressed, but may be considered as making the proposition, that there was no evidence upon which the court should submit to the jury whether the plaintiff should recover for the value
of the bonds taken from him. The plaintiff now insists that this
was not the only question for the jury, and that it was for them
also to inquire whether he did not suffer bodily harm from the assault and battery upon him, and thus sustain damage for which
he should have compensation.
This position of the plaintiff cannot be maintained. Plainly, the
gist of'this action was not for bodily damage, nor was that an incidental part of it, kept in consideration as an element of recovery.
The complaint does indeed aver that three men entered the car,
and with violence and great force assaulted the plaintiff. There are
lacking though all the other averments, which .are wont to be made
in an action for an assault and battery, either under the commonlaw forms of pleading or those which conform to the Code.
The demand for judgment is for a sum just equal to the averred
value of.the bonds taken (though this is not of controlling weight:
Tyng v. Comm. Warehouse, 58 N. Y. 308), with interest thereon,
the latter of which is a demand for judgiaent, which was never yet,
we venture to say, annexed to a statement of the amount of damages
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from an assault and battery. The course of the trial, as disclosed
by the record, shows that the inquiry into the outrage upon the
plaintiff was cohfined to the loss by him of his bonds, and the
manner in which they were taken from him, and the facts of the
violence to his person were drawn out but as a part of the violence
of taking away his property. And when the case is at last submitted to the jury, the charge of the court labors with the matter
of the loss of the bonds, with no word of the bodily harm to the
defendant, and with no suggestion or request in behalf of the plaintiff that there should be. There is this explicit instruction to the
jury: "In case you find for the plaintiff, the amount would be
$16,685.47, that being the value of the bonds and interest, as stipulated between the counsel." There was no exception or suggestion drawn from either counsel by this remark, which was not only
significant in itself, as showing that the court had heard of no other
damage sought, but also as showing that the counsel, in stipulating
upon the amount, had confined themselves to the value of the bonds,
and bad not conferred upon, or thought of, the subject of the bodily
harm. True, we are not strictly bound to the pleadings, as once
we were, so that they are not always conclusive; but the pleadings,
the case made, the findings of a judge or referee, the questions presented to the jury, the exceptions taken, and whatever else appears
upon the record which will inform, all these must advise us what
was the issue made and tried, and what we are to review as the real
matter controverted between the parties: MerKechnie v. Ward,
58 N. Y. 541.
We think that it would be going wide from the track of the trial,
if we should -now render.a judgment based upon the notion that
damages for the bodily harm received by the plaintiff was any part
of the matter in litigation between the parties. The issue contested
was upon a graver and far more important matter. We must treat
the action as the court and counsel treated it at the trial, and, for
aught that appears upon the record, as it was treated at the General
Term, as one to recover of the defendants the value of the bonds
lost and never restored. Then the case is this: The plaintiff bought
of the defendants the ordinary passage ticket, and paid for it the
usual price. By that act the defendants assumed to him the duty
of carrying him, and his ordinary baggage, that is, his ordinary
clothiing, articles of personal convenience, usual ornaments, and
money for his personal expenses. He carried in his clothing upon
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his person, without the knowledge of the defendants, without any
notic:, to them, as matter of fact, solely in his own care and custody,
a package of negotiable securities of much value. These securities
were taken from him in the car of the defendants, by the violence
of menm who had no connection with the defendants, and whose presence upon the car was not known to the defendants, though it might
have been. And the jury have found that he was not guilty of
negligence contributing to his loss, and that the defendants were
guilty of negligence, in not caring for the protection of the plaintiff
from violence while on their car, and that because of that negligence
the robbery took place.
If the claim of the plaintiff is to be sustained, it must be held,
that from the circumstances of the case, the defendants owed such
duty to the plaintiff as that they were insurers of the safe carriage
of his securities, in the mode of 6arriage adopted by him; and for
no greater consideration than the usual price or compensation paid
by any passenger on their vehicles, and without knowledge or notice
that he had them upon his person.
The mind conversant with legal topics, and wont to look at the
consequences of the laying down of a rule of law, and the lengths
to which it may logically be carried, does not readily yield assent
to that proposition, and inquires upon what principle the liability
o0 the defendants is sought to be established. It is apparent that
if the carrier is liable in such case for a loss by robbery it is liable
also for a loss by theft by strangers (see Abbott v. Bradstreet, 55
Me. 530), or for loss resulting from negligence in any way, no
matter what the character of the valuables, or the amount of them
borne upon the person, and in the sole care and custody of the passenger. It is then seen that the carrier of passengers, against its
will, with no knowledge or notice of the charge and risk put upon
it, becomes more, in fact, than a carrier of passengers; it becomes
an "express" carrier of packages of value. It becomes such "express" carrier with unusual burdens. It is without knowledge of
the value for which it is liable. It is not given the custody of the
package. It is liable to be the subject of false and fraudulent
claims of individuals, and of false and collusive claims of conspira,tors, and the victim of wicked plans, sustained by made-up testimony. . This, perhaps, partakes of the argument ab inconvenienti.
But it is a maxim, argumentum ab ineonvenienti, plurimum valet
in lege. Good authority says, that aiguments in doubtful cases,
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drawn from inconvenience, are of great weight: Per IILATn1, J.;
Steel v. Houghton et ux., 1 II. Bl.51-61 ; Doe ex dLm. v. Ak/,/at,
2 B. & 0. 779-798; per DALLAS, J., Deane v. Clayton. 7 Taunt.
489-527; and this argument is worthy of notice in this case
against a carrier of passengers only, for it was in use in olden
time against a carrier of goods, to found the law of his duty and liability. The carrier of goods is now held liable for the loss of goods
stolen from him, though without his negligence. The rigor of the law
in this respect arises from reasons of public policy (which is another
phrase for public convenience), and to prevent the combinations
that might be made with thieves and robbers: Setieffelin v. 1iarvey, 6 Johns. 170-177, and cases there cited. It would seem that
it should have another side too, and be applied in favor of a carrier
of passengers, to protect him from risks which he has not knowingly
assumed. And otherwise, as is well said at General Term, " the
rule limiting the liability of the carrier to a reasonable amount of
money to meet the expenses and conveniences of the traveller,
would be so completely evaded as to be practically nullified." The
inquiry for a principle, for the proposition of the plaintiff to rest
upon, is made with more doubt of a convincing answer, for the
reason, that there is a principle, at the foot of the obligation or
duty of a common carrier, which seems adverse to the existence of
a right of action in the plaintiff. A common carrier is bound, in
that his occupation is in its nature a public one, to carry all that is
offered to him for carriage, in the line of his particular branch of
service. For this he has a right to demand a reasonable conipensation. The amount of that compensation must in reason vary, as the
amount of risk which he takes is varied. And he who employs the
carrier is bound not to conceal from him the facts in his case, which
materially increase that risk: Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wend. 459.
And if he does conceal, it is a fraud upon the carrier, if it is to
subject him to a liability so much greater than he contracts for, or
than he is bound to suppose is assumed by him: Sewall v. Allen,
6 Wend. 335, per Chancellor, p. 349 ; Nat. Bank v. 1. J- C.Railroad Co., 20 Ohio St. 259. Now it is apparent that the defendant
would not have engaged with the plaintiff to carry safely those
securities, left upon his person, and solely in his custody, at no more
than the usual rate of compensation for the carriage of a passenger
and his ordinary baggage and travelling paraphernalia. And inasmuch as they would not, and could not have been compelled to,
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have so engaged, without an increase of remuneration, it follows
that taking him with .the valuable securities with which he was
indued, they, in ignorance and unnotified thereof, owed him no
duty, as a general rule of their occupation, to give to him and his
property more than the usual care, demandable froi them by any
passenger. In such case, in legal contemplation, the thing of value
is not in the charge of the carrier as such, and he has made no contract, and entered into no duty, in regard to it. This is upon the
assumption, for the purpose of the case, that though as to the plaintiff they were carriers of passengers only, they might be compelled
to take the charge for the journey of articles not a part of a passenger's ordinary baggage and equipment, and yet of high value.
It is at least doubtful whether, had the plaintiff given the defendants notice of his intention of carrying with him these securities
of value, they could have been compelled to have undertaken the
safe carriage and sure delivery of ihem, or that it was any. part of
their duty so to do: Sewall v. Allen, &uprd.
The plaintiff seeks to base the right to recover of the defendants
upon the ground that they were bound to protect the passengers in
their cars from open invasion and forcible assault, injury and robbery. We do not need to deny this proposition here; we need not
shrink nor stretch the rule laid down in Putnam v. Broadwiay and
Seventh Ave. Bailroad Co., 55 N. Y. 108. A carrier of passengers
is bound to exercise the utmost vigilance in maintaining order and
guarding his passengers against violence: Id. But if he neglects
to do so, for what is he liable ? His liability arises upon contract
expressly made or implied from his duty or. from the duty of his
employment, public in its nature. It is plain that the plaintiff and
defendants here made no express contract in relation to these securities. Whatever contract the sale and purchase of a passenger
ticket expresses, it does not make a contract which was not in the
minds of both the parties or imputable to them by law. We have
shown that the law does not impute a contract to carry, for a passenger, other goods than ordinary baggage. - And as the defend-.
ants had no knowledge or notice of these securities, they could not
have had intention to engage for the carriage and delivery of them.
If the plaintiff is to recover, it must be ex -delicto, upon the duty
of defendants. A public carrier of goods is bound to vigilance,
and may set up as an excuse for want of safe carriage and safe delivery nothing but an exempting act of the shipper, an act of God
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or of the public enemy. Yet if the shipper conceal from the carrier or fail to notify him that in a package of mean appearance is
placed an article of great value, the ordinary negligence of the
carrier may sustain a judgment for what a passenger usually carries,
but will not warrant a recovery by the shipper of the worth of his
property of great price: Mile8 v. Cattell, 6 Bing. 743. The carrier of goods, in the absence of express agreement, is liable by reason of his negligence for damages to such amount as would ordinarily be expected to result therefrom. So, though a carrier of
passengers is bound to guard one going in his vehicle from violence,
the damages he must pay if he neglects his duty are such as would
ordinarily result therefrom, as would naturally be contemplated by
the parties on making their contract, or assuming their relative
rights and obligations. Such a carrier is bound to take the passenger and to carry together with him his lutggage, reasonable in size
and weight, and in kind and value of the articles filling it, such as
is naturally and usually required by a passenger and reasonable
for his personal use while on the way or at his place of destination.
Should that luggage be lost by the carrier, or misdelivered or stolen
from him, though it may contain large sums of money or articles
of great value or things not destined for personal use, the carrier
is liable, not however for them, but for so inuia -bf the contents as
falls within the classification we have given -bove.
In the same
way (it may be, though we do not pass authoritatively upon it),
should a passenger be assailed in the vehicle of the carrier, in such
circumstances as that it was a breach of the duty of the latter
that he failed to protect the former from violence, and should he be
robbed of portions of his clothing or usual and reasonable articles
of personal ornaments, his watch or his purse with the money for
his travelling and other personal expenses, it may be that the carrier would be liable for the loss which his passenger had sustained.
But, if the passenger had seen fit privately to place and carry upon
his person securities or articles of great value, not falling within
the above category, without the knowledge of, or notice to, the carrier, and in the melee they should be lost or taken, the latter is not
liable for them. He has entered into no especial contract to carry
and deliver them. He owes no duty in regard to them by reason
of his public calling, that is not fulfilled, so long as he is free from
gross negligence and fraud. The absence of notice to him of the
purpose to carry them has prevented him from exacting a reasonVOL. XXVI-65
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able compensation for the carriage, ahd what is more, from making
provision for safety, in measure witl the increase of the hazard incurred. For the carriage of himself, his watch, his purse, &c., &c.,
the passenger does perhaps make contract with the carrier, or so
does set in operation the duty of the latter, when he buys his ticket
or takes his passage, and does, it may be, legally demand of him
a care and diligence up to the needs of the hazard, and renders
him liable for such damage as is in the contemplation of the contract or the scope of the duty. We have of late, at some length,
considered some questions having an intimate relation with this,
and refer to that case for some authorities : Aapnin v. Dinsnwre,
62 N. Y. 35.
The learned counsel for the appellant concedes and contends,
that the property stolen in this case is not to be considered as baggage, or to be governed by the rules which have been laid down as
to the loss of that, and liability therefor. He puts the right to
recover upon the duty of the carrier to protect the person of the
passenger from violence. Is it logical to say that the defendants
are not liable for the loss of these securities as baggage, or as goods,
wares, merchandise; that is, that the presence of them in the car,
in the character of a valuable thing, did not create a duty as to
them; but that by the fact of their being on the person of the
plaintiff in .the car, there arose from the duty to care for his person
a duty to care for them? They were nothing else on his person
than off of it. They did not become a part of his person, and thus
evoke a duty to care for them as a part thereof. They were still
property, extraordinarily in the vehicle of the defendants. Nor
do we see how the fact that the loss occurred through violence to the
person of the plaintiff from other men, rather than from accident,
makes a difference in the case. The defendants were bound to protect the plaintiff from the violence of a railway accident, as well as
from the intentional violence of ruffians and rogues. Would it be
claimed that if, in the occurrence of a railway accident, these securities had become lost from the person of the plaintiff, in any of
the many ways that may be imagined, with no other human intervention than was concerned in the accident itself, that the defendants would have been liable for the loss? - Such a case has been
adjudicated in the negative, after ingenious argument and wellconsidered opinion: 20 Ohio St., supra. To hold otherwise would
be to extend the liability of the carrier to a new matter by reason
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of the human violence and the injury therefrom, making the character alone of the act create a new duty. The carrier of passengers
is liable for harm to their rersons from the violence of intruders,
when he has been negligent in his duty to protect from it. lie is
liable for harm to their property when he has been negligent in his
care of it, if confided to his care, either in fact or in law. His
negligence is thus the ground of liability in both cases. But the
proposition contended for would make the negligence by which violence comes to the person and property of the passenger from other
human beings, far more extensive in its consequences than the
negligence by which violence comes to the person and property
or to the property alone, from inanimate things. We see no reason
for this. We have confined our consideration to the ground taken
by counsel, with such illustrations and arguments drawn from kindred topics as seemed profitably to bear upon the subject. We
have not thought it well to rely upon a rule laid down in Tower v.
N. & . Railroad Co., 7 Hill 47, although there the article lost
was a part of a passenger's clothing, and was taken by him into the
car of the defendant, and kept in his own custody, for the reason
that there was in that case no element of violence to the passenger
and loss of property thereby ; and because the case is also put upon
the negligence of the passenger in the care of his property, which
we cannot assume in this case.' ; There are some cases cited by
counsel in which the learned judges in their opinions have used
phrases to the effect that the carrier is liable for all the injllrl or
for any injury sustained: Flintv. Norwich Tr. Co., 6 Blatch. 158;
55 N. Y. 108, supra. In those cases the cause of action was solely
for injury to the person; and the remarks were appropriate. They
are not to be applied to a case of this kind. Like "every other proposition laid down by a judge 'they' ought to be understood with
particular reference to the facts of the case then before the court."
Pbr Lord ELLENBORQUGH, C. J., Hunter v. Princess,10 East 392.
It is intimated on the points of the lehrned counsel for the appellants that the jury might have found that the plaintiff carried a bond
with which to raise the money for his journey. If it is meant
that such a consideration as this would require the submission of
the case to the jury, it suffices to say, that there is no such hint
in the testimony upon the trial; and it would not have been right
for the court to have submitted such a question to the jury.
From our consideration of the case, it is our judgment that the
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valuable securities carried by the plaintiff were not a part of the
property, whicli h could in his ordinary relation of passenger of
the defendants bear about his person at their risk, and under their
duty as carriers to protect him and his necessary, convenient and
ornamental reasonable personal chattels and money ; that for that
reason the value of them does not properly enter into an estimate
of the damages with which they should be charged, on a recovery
by him against them, for not protecting him from violence while he
was rightfully in their car, they being assumed to be guilty of negligence therein, and he being taken as free from contributory negligence. It was error then, under the circumstances of this case, to
submit any question to the jury. The complaint should have been
dismissed. We think that the question we have determined was
fairly presented by the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that this "injury and grievance is too remote to charge the defendants with damage," and that, "under all the circumstances of the
case, the plaintiff has no legal ground for a recovery" against them.
The order for a new trial must be affirmed, and judgment absolute given for the defendant on the stipulation.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Virginia.
W. T. BLACKWELL ET AL. v. W. E. DIBRELL ET AL.
A trade-mark, consisting of a word and symbol, arbitrarily assumed, may be lost
by non-use, especially if the disuse continue as long as eight years.
If an equivalent trade-mark is, without any knowledge of the first one, originated and devised by another person during the period of such disuse, for use at a
particular place, or for a commodity of a particular region, that other person may
thereby acquire a right of exclusive use in the second trade-mark, at such place,
on such product, and may enjoin the general use of the first trade-mark.
If the second trade-mark, during such period of disuse, acquires a peculiar geographical and commercial signification, so that the use of the original one, as an
arbitrary device, would operate to deceive and defraud the public, a court of equity
may enjoin against the use of the first trade-mark.
In order to constitute one' suit an estoppel in another, four conditions must
exist, viz. : there must be an identity of the cause of action, of the parties, of the
character in which the parties sue, and of the thing in controversy.

BILL in equity for an injunction and account. The facts as they
appeared in the pleadings and the evidence were that some time
before the year 1860, the North Carolina railroad was laid off over the
farm of Dr. Bartlet Durham, in Alamance county, North Carolina.
A station was established there and called Durham'sStation. This
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spot shortly became the seat of a small tobacco factory, a blacksmith
shop, a tavern, and the residences of two or three families. It
remained an insignificant place until after the civil war, in 1865.
It then began to grow up under the effects of a very prosperous
tobacco business which had arisen there. In 1866 it was incorporated as a town and called Durham. Now it is a place of several
thousand inhabitants, and of a.very large business.
The original tobacco factory of 1859 was conducted by the firm
of Morris & Wright. This firm principally manufactured plug
tobacco, but it utilized its clippings and waste tobacco by putting
it in bags and disposing of it as smoking tobacco.
Some time before or in 1861, one of the partners of this firm,
William A. Wright (who is connected with the defence in this suit),
sold out all his interest to the "other partner, Morris. and went off
into the neighborhood, where he manufactured tobacco in a rude
way for a year, and then joined the Confederate army and disappeared from -Durham'sStation. The business, however, went on
under Morris, and subsequently by assignment under one Green.
The latter adopted as his brand or label the name "Durham Smoking
Tobacco," and connected with these words the side figure of a shorthorn bull, as a symbol of the word Durham ; and he had a full-size
painting of such a bull placed broadside upon his factory, in conspicuous view of the railroad, as an advertisement of his business
to all travellers. Green having died, his business passed by succession and assignment to Blackwell and others, and is now conducted by W. T. Blackwell & Co., the complainants in this cause.
The other partner, Wright, of the original firm of Morris &
Wright, who had sold out in 1861, began in 1869 the manufacture
of tobacco in Liberty, Va., and subsequently in Lynchburg. While
at Liberty, hearing that J. R. Green, the successor to Morris &
Wright, at Durham, was using the Durham bull as a trade-mark,
he adopted the device of the head and neck of a short-horn bull on
his tobacco. While at Lynchburg, in 1871, Wright sold to S. S.
Armstead a patent which he had then recently obtained (No.
111,712) for a compound liquid flavoring which he used in making
"an improved smoking tobacco" called " Durham Smoking Tobacco,"
in which appellation he used the word -Durhamas an arbitrary
term for the smoking tobacco made with the said patented flavoring
liquid. It appeared from the answer of defendants, Dibrell & Co.,
that they used, with the consent and by the authority of the said
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Wright, a label substantially the same as that.used by the complainants, and filed by them as an exhibit, to wit, a label having the
words and device "Established 1860, at Durham, N. C., the original Durham Smoking Tobacco, W. S. Wright, originator and patentee."
The complainants claimed that the reputation of Durham smoking tobacco was owing to the influence of the climate and soil of
that part of North Carolina, whose product was brought to Durham
Station and there put up with great care and skill by themselves;
and further, that a circumstance at the close of the war gave their
manufacture under this name its widespread reputation. At- the
time that Sherman's and Johnston's armies were in Alamance
county, Green happened to have a large quantity of loose leaf
tobacco lying in bulk on the floor of his factory. Of courae this
was a prey which soldiers of either army, as they passed along,
eagerly seized upon; and the evidence is, that the whole of this
loose tobacco was thus carried away; and, as the armies were soon
disbanded, much of it is conjectured to have been carried into 'distant parts of the Union. At all events, the excellent ituality of
this smoking tobacco speedily obtained widespread advertisement
and celebrity; and ever since then orders have come to Durham
for it from every quarter of the United States.
The complainants therefore claimed that the word Durham, as a
trade-mark for smoking tobacco, was a geographical and descriptive
term and could not be lawfully used to describe other tobacco not
prepared at that place. They moreover denied that itwas used by
Morris & Wright or by any one prior to Green in 1865, but claimed
that even if it was used by Morris & Wright, they were entitled, As
the successors of that firm, to its exclusive use at the present time.
The defendants, on the other hand, who claimbd title under Wright,
insisted that the word Durham, as used by them or their assignor
Wright, had no reference to the place called Durham's Station; that
Wright, when he manifactured tobacco near Durham's place, then
of utter insignificance, used the word Durham as an arbitrary term;
that his tobacco was flavored with certain liquids invented and artificially concocted by him; that it was this flavoring, and not the
soil or climate of the region trading to Durham, that gave his tobacco its excellence, and that the name Durham and the device of
a Durham bull were suggested to hini, about the year 1860, by seeing the brand of -Durlhammustard on a tin box. Wright's testi-
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mony on this head is as follows: Was in business at Liberty, Va.,
in 1869 ; that was thc first time the bull's head was used; first view
was to adopt the entire bull in connection with the word Durham;
the reason of not doing so was that two sons in Kentucky wrote
him that J. R. Green, of Durham, N. C., had adopted the bull on
his brand, and he did not wish to interfere with anything that was
ahead of him; first conceived the idea of using the word Durham
and the bull in connection with it in 1860 ; and the reason why he
did not carry it out until 1869 was his inability to do so for want
of funds; the idea was first suggested by picking up a can of Durham mustard with the vignette of a bull on it.
Wright claimed that 'Morris & Wright used the word Durham in
their labels in 1859 and 1860, and that he himself used the word
in his label when living near Durham .in 1861.
In 1871 a suit was brought in the Superior Court of North Carolina, by W. T. Blackwell against W. A. Wright (Blackwell v.
Wdiglt, 73-. C. 310), in which the complainant, claiming a right
to the exclusive use of the word Durham, as a descriptive term for
his smoking tobacco on the same label with his symbolic trademark of the side view of a short-horn bull, sought to enjoin the
defendant Wright from using the same word- Durham as a description of his smoking tobacco upon a label similar in color, material
and general appearance, having on it the head and neck of a shorthorn bull. The suit was a trade-mark suit, and the complaint contained no charge of fraud in deceiving the public, and no prayer.
for an injunction to prevent the use of a label deceptively assimilated to that of the complainant. This suit, after going to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, was dismissed on demurrer to
the complaint, the demurrer being based on the ground that the
complainant did not, by formal allegations of assignments, trace
his title to the exclusive use of the trade-mark in question from J.
R. Green.
In the same year a suit was brought in the United States Circuit
Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Lynchburg, by W.
T. Blackwell and J. S. Carr, partners trading under the firm-name
of W. T. Blackwell, against S. S. Armistead (Blackwell v. Arnistead, Browne on Trade-mark 510). In that suit the complainants
claimed the exclusive right to use the trade-mark already described,
including the word Durham and the side view of a short-horn bull,
charged an infringement of it by Armstead, as assignee of William
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A. Wright, in the use of the label of Wright, also already described,
and prayed an injunction against all further use of the last-named
label. In this suit the complainants prevailed, and a perpetual
injunction was granted, and the matters in controversy were afterwards compromised.
Under these facts complainants prayed an injunction against
defendants' use of the word Durham in connection with smoking
tobacco, and an account.
,S. . Phillips and TV. A. iaury, of Washington, L. 1B. Page,
of Richmond, and J. TV. 1dniel, of Lynchburg, for complainants.
T.
. Browne, of Washington, and Williams
Lynchburg, for defendants.

Digges, of

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HUGHES, J.-It is useless to review all the points relied upon
by counsel on each side in their able arguments in thQ cause. I
shall consider only those questions upon which, in my judgment,
the case really turns.
I shall first deal with the objection of estoppel or- res judicata,
urged by each party against the other.
In order for one suit to constitute an estoppel upon any party to
another suit, four conditions must co-exist, viz. : 1. There must be
an identity of the cause of action; 2. There must be an identity of
parties to the suits; 3. There must be an identity in the character
or quality of the respective parties ; and 4. There must be an identity of the thing in controversy. See Smith v. Turner, 1 Hughes
375.
These conditions of identity do not exist between the present
case and either of the cases of Blackwell v. Wright, or Blackwell
v. Armistead. Those cases, therefore, do not operate as estoppels.
Nor do they at all affect the one now under consideration, except
so far as they are precedents of authority upon the principles which
were decided by them. In Blackwell v. Wright, the decision was
upon demurrer to the complaint; and in technical effect it was
only that Blackwell had not traced his title to his trade-mark by
proper allegations from Green; while on the merits the decision
went only so far as to determine that the allegations of the complaint did not make a case of exclusive right to the trade-mark for
the plaintiff. The complaint there dia not charge that Wright's
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use of the trade-mark was a fraud upon the public, or pray for an
injunction on that ground. None of these allegations can be made
of the complainants' bill in this ease.
In Blackwell v. Armistead it is true that the decision was upon
the principal questions raised in the present case ; but owing to the
character of the pleadings it was based upon grounds narrower and
more technical than those upon which I propose to found the present decision. That suit was a trade-mark case. 'T['his is more, and
involves the question of the fraudulent use of a trade-mark, to the
injury of the public at large, as well as of the complainants. Therefore, neither.of the two cases which have been urged in estoppel
governs even as a precedent the present one, which I shall now proceed to consider.
Two ques.tions arise upon the pleadings and evidence: 1. The
first is, whether the defendants have any right at all to use a label
in which the word .Durhamis used as descriptive of smoking tobacco,
and in which the figure of a short-lorn bull is used as a symbd of
the word Durham ; their right to the exclusive use of it not being
claimed; 2. The second question is, whether the complainants have
a right to the exclusive use of such a label. In considering the first
question. I shall, for the sake-of brevity, speak of the defcndbmlts'
right to use the label described as Wright's, inasmuch as their title
to use such a label could come, under the evidence in this cause,
only from Wright. Has, then, Wright or his assignees now, or
have they at any time since 1869 had, any right at all to use a
label having in it the word Durham, as descriptive of smoking
tobacco, and having also in it the figure of a short-horn btrll. or any
part of that animal, as a symbol of the word Durham le Of course
their title to use the word and the symbol stands on the same basis;
if it fails as to the word it fails also as to the sypnbol of the word.
There can be no doubt of Green's original right to the exclusive
use of the full figure of a short-horn bull as a trade-mark. That is
virtually conceded by Wright himself in his testimony. As to the
word Durham as descriptive of smoking tobacco, the right to use it
is in this cause claimed by defendants, who do business in Richmond,
Va., and who advertise and sell, as Durham smoking tobacco,
tobacco which they put up in Richmond, -and which they obtain
from any source available to them other than Di'riam.
Such a practice necessarily deceives every purchaser who, in purchasing tis "Dur am"' smoking tobacco, believes that he "ispurVOL. XXVI.-66
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chasing the fine tobacco put up in the place of that name in North
Carolina. Dibrell & Co. claim solely from Wright. What, then,
is Wright's title under which this deception comes about? He
claims that lie did not in 1860 sell his right in the label used by
Morris & Wright, to his partner Morris, when he sold all his interest in the business. Iie claims that he derived the word Durham
and the device of a short-horn bull from a Durham mustard box.
Ile pretends that neither the word nor the device, as invented and
use( by him, was descriptive or geographical in purport, but that
they were arbitrary symbols, and that having been so at the beginning, he and his assignees have still a right to use them.
The objection to this pretension lies not merely in the improbability of the origin of the use of the word Durham and its symbol
which Wright recounts, or in the unsatisfactory character of the
evidence on which his original right to use the word and its symbol
is based, or in the presumption that when he sold in 1861 he sold
all his interest to Morris; but it lies also in these two facts, namely:
1st, that whatever title Wright had to the use of the word Durham
after leaving Morris, in or about the year 1861, was lost by nonuse, his disuse continuing through a period of probably eight or
nine years after he left the vicinity of Durham's; and, 2d, that
during this long period of disuse the brand of Durham Smoking
Tobacco acqui.ed a definite and peculiar meaning with dealers and
consumers; the word Durham ceasing to be (even if it ever was) a
mere arbitrary term; and obtaining a geographical signification as to
the place Durham, and a commercial signification as to the article
of tobacco manufactured at Durham. During the interval of disuse
the phrase -Durhamtobacco had come to indicate that portion of
the product of a particular region of country which was marketed
at the place called -Durham'sor -Durham. The phrase "Durham
Smoking Tobacco" had come to indicate in all markets and among
all dealers and consumers the smoking tobacco marketed and manufactured at this place of Durham, in North Carolina.
It was not until after this signification had attached to the phrase
that Wright adopted (or, as he pretends, returned to) the use of the
word Durham, which he had abandoned. If, as he claims, the word
Durham had in fact been used by him at first as an arbitrary trademark ; and if, in addition, he had continued the use of it without
interruption down to 1866 and on to the present time, that use by
him would itself have prevented the other and local signification from
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attaching to the brand and word; for, in that case, Durham smoking
tobacco would have described two tobaccos: first, those marketed
and manufactured at Durham; and, second, those sprinkled with
Wright's "Dm'rham" juic'.
But he did abandon its use; he stood by for some eight years
and allowed a peculiar commercial and local signification to attach
to the word Durham as descriptive of smoking tobacco, and not
until after that local and commercial signification had come to identify the tobacco labelled with the word all over the country as coming from a particular region, and as having a particular quality,
and not until after this brand had come to be worth thousands of
dollars to the manufacturers of this particular tobacco at this par.
ticular place, did he begin (or resume) the use of the device, which
he claims to have derived from the mustard can. To put that word
now on tobaccos grown elsewhere than at Durham, even though
sprinkled with his "Durham" decoction, is, in the light of the
evidence in this case, to pass them off as tobaccos coming from
Durham, and is to deceive and defraud all who deal in and purchase the commodity as smoking tobacco from Durham. It has so
come to pass, from Wright's non-use for eight years, that to manufacture and sell other tobaccos at all and brand them with the word
Durham, is to deceive the public, no matter what liquid may be
used on them. Under existing circumstances, to manufacture even
Durham tobaccos elsewhere than at Durham and to sprinkle tem
with a foreign liquid, is to deceive the public generally and those
who put up the genuine article at that place particularly. The
manufacture of these tobaccos at that place is the best guarantee
which the public and the trade can have that the commercial article
labelled Durham Smoking Tobacco, and sold in all markets, is genuine, and prepared under the "fewest temptations to adulteration.
That the right to use a trade-mark may be lost by abandonment
or disuse is too clear to need argument or the support of authority.
The law of the subject is stated in the chapter on Abandonment,
sects. 674 to 691, of Browne on Trade-marks. It cannot be pretended -that in Green's first use of his label, in 1865 or 1866, he
had any intention of taking up an old label at second hand, or had
any knowledge or belief that Wright or any one else could claim
the label which he then devised as entirely novel and peculiar.
The field was open to his enterprise and invention for establishing
his business and inventing his label and trade-mark just as he did.
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Green's adoption in 1865 or 1866 of the word Durham, as descriptive of the best tobacco of North Carolina, put up by him, and
of the bull as the symbol of the word, was naturally suggested by
the facts of his business. If Wright had ever had such a label,
which I do not feel that the evidence warrants us to believe, it was
in 1865-'6, unknown in Durham; had been abandoned even then
for some fiur years ; had never signified anything but tobacco
sprinkled with Wright's decoction; and had never borne the valuable and creditable commercial signification which the climate and
soil aiid good husbandry of North Carolina and the enterprise of a
Durham manufacturer were about to give it.
By the several facts of Wright's non-user of the label for eight
years; of its never having, even as claimed by him, had any but
an arbitrary significance as tobacco sprinkled with a species of artificial treacle; and of its having, during a long period of disuse,
acquired a new, wholly different and well and widely-known geographical and commercial signification, Wright lost his right of
using the label altogether. His use of it now operates necessarily
to mislead and deceive the public as to the source of production
and quality of the article bearing the, label, thereby defrauding
them; and the court will therefore make a decree of perpetual injunction against his further use of it.
2. As to the second question, whether Blackwell & Co. have an
exclusive right to the use of the label described in the pleadings,
I think, on the evidence submitted, that they have. We have no
hesitation in so deciding as against the defendant in this cause, and
will incorporate in the decree of the court an order for an account
of profits against the defendants, as prayed for in the bill.
The label and trade-mark of complainants was established in
1865, by J. R. Green. His business and that of his successors
built up the insignificant and obscure place "Durham's Station,"
into the flourishing town "Durham."
The town grew up during
the first four or five years of the use of the label, and owed its
growth in chief part to the business indicated by the label. In
that respect the case is similar to that of the trade-mark Cocoaine:
Burnett v. Phalon, 8 Keyes 594. In respect to the commercial
article bearing the geographical name, it is similar to that of the
Akron cement: Newman v. Alwood, 51 N. Y. 189. Thd right
of the complainants in this case has the double strength of that of
the proprietors of the trade-mark Cocoaine and of that of the Akron
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cement. The use of the principal characteristics of their trademark by manufacturers not conducting their business at Durham
is a deception put upon the public, and may be enjoined on that
ground alone, irrespectively of the trade-mark right. Tie use of
the trade-mark invented by Green, under which ie and his successors built up his trade, and built up the town of Durhan, like
the use of the word Akron to the loprietors of the commercial
article bearing that name, belongs exclusively to the successors of
Green, and the court should secure its exclusive use to them.
I had some doubt whether, in a litigation between Blackwell &
Co., on one hand, and defendants not doing business in the town
of Durham on the other,.it was competent for the court to decree.
that Blackwell & Co. have the exclusive right to the use of the
word and symbol characterizing their trade-mark: but it is certainly competent for us to render a decree responsive to the issues
made up by the allegations and denials of the bill and answer, one
of which is this right of exclusive use claimed by Blaekwell & Co.
As between the complainants and defendants in this suit, therefore,
we may so decree, even though other persons than the defendants
to this xecord be not bound by the decree.

SuPreme Court of ._ississilpi.
B. H. SMITH v. THE STATE.
An untrue assertion by a person who is endeavoring to procure goods on credit,
that he is not trading with and is not indebted to any other person, is a sufficient
false pretence to support an indictment.
Where the representations were partly true and partly false it is not necessary
that the selling of the goods should have been induced by the false alone, or that
the false should be independent and disconnected from the true ; it i .ufficient if
the false formed a constituent and material part of the inducement without which
the goods would not have been sold.
Nor is it necessary that the false pretence should be such as would have deceived,
or been likely to deceive, a man of ordinary prudence.

PLAINTIFF in error was convicted, in the Circuit Court of lankin
county, of obtaining goods under false pretences, and sentenced to
three years' confinement in the penitentiary. From this judgment
he appealed to this court. The facts are set forth in the opinion of
the court, which was delivered by
J.-The false pretences alleged were four in number:
1. That he had a good crop; 2. That he had, or would make,
,,
CHALMERS,

SMITH r. TIlE STATE.

or eight bales of cotton ; 3. That he had traded with no one during
the year; 4. That he owed no debts, save one to the party to whom
he made the representations, and one of 520 to a person in Trenton,
Smith county, in which county he lived. As to the first statement,
to wit, that he had a good crop, it was neither negatived in the indictment nor by the evidence, and may, therefore, be disregarded.
As to the second, to wit, that he had, or would make, seven or eight
bales of cotton, it was charged in the indictment in the alternative,
was at most a matter of opinion as to the probable yield of his then
growing crop, and it is not shown to have been either a false or unreasonable expectation on his part. On all of these grounds it mu st
be left out of view. The third and fourth pretences, as to his not
having traded elsewhere, and as to his existing indebtedness, were
properly laid in the indictment, and were sustained by the proof.
Plaintiff in error was a man of small means, engaged in farming on
a limited scale. His usual crop, with a favorable yield, amounted
annually to six or seven bales of cotton. On the 8th of August
1876, he opened accounts with three different merchants in Morton,
Scott county, making purchases from one of them on that day, to
the amount of $77.85, besides smaller amounts from the other two.
Four days afterward, he appeared in Brandon, Rankin county, and
applied for credit to the prosecutors in this case. He was closely
questioned as to his means and indebtedness. He stated that his
crop was good; that he would make seven or eight bales of cotton;
that lie was trading with, or purchasing supplies from, no other'
merchant, and that with the exception of a small note-held against
him by the prosecutors, and the sum of $20 due in Trenton, he
owed no debts. On the faith of these statements an account was
opened with him, and on that dayle purchased $75 worth of goods
on a credit. Ile came back twice afterward-within a few weeks,
and increased the indebtedness to $150.
On one of these occasions the liberality of his purchases attracted
attention, and each time, he was questioned anew. Each time he
repeated with earnestness his former statements. During all this
time he was purchasing also in Morton. The result was that within
six weeks he bought in Morton and Brandon together, goods to the
amount of $600, which was considerably more than a full crop would
usually have yielded him.
In point of fact, he seems to have made less than two bales of
cotton, but this was owing to an early and disastrous frost. Among
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his purchases he is shown to have bought five barrels of flour in
little more than a month. Within six ieekM, after tlic die of' his
last purchase from the prosecutors, he went int,., voluntary hanlkruptcy, and none of his creditors were paid anything. We think
these facts fairly support the verdict of guilty, if no errors of lr.
were committed on the trial to his prejudice. We will notice the
assignments of error discussed by counsel.
1. There was no error in refusing a continuation. No sulp, nas
had been issued for the absent witnesses, and no excuse was. ofl.rcd
for the failure to do so.
2. There was no error in setting aside the juror Mosely. We
do not agree with the learned judge below, in the opinion that the.
juror claimed his exemption by stating that he would prefer to
attend to his private business, while saying, at the same time, that
nevertheless he was willing to serve and did not claim his exemption; but we do agree with him in doubting whether the party was
an important juror. Though he stated that he had neither formed
nor expressed an opinion, he admitted that he was a neighbor of
the accused ; that he had heard the matter much discussed; that the
accused had come by his house that morning and informed him that
the trial was to come off that day ; that thereupon he had come to
town, and that he was under strong personal as well as pecuniary
obligations to the accused, and to other parties indicted fbr the
same offence.
It was held in AfcGuire's case, that the judge might set aside a
juror who had been accepted by both sides, upop discovering that
he was under indictment for an offence similar tO the one to be tried,
though this formed, under the statute, no ground of challenge.
We will not disturb the verdict here, on account of the action of
the court in this matter: -l'eGuirev. The State, 37 Miss. 369.
3. There was no error in laying bqfore the jury the itemized
accounts of the accused with the merchants in MNorton. The yucstion at issue was whether the accused had knowingly, feloniously
and fraudulently made false statements, intending thereby to obtain
goods upon the faith of such statements, and had actually so obtained them.
The statements were that he was not trading elsewhere, and was
not indebted. Everything which tended either to show their falsity
or to establish the wilful fraud committed in uttering them, was
competent.
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4. There was no error in the instructions for the state.
5. The first instruction asked fbr defen(lant was properly refused.
It sougit to draw a distinction between the goods obtained on the
first day and those thereafter procured, and to refer the delivery of
these latter to the contract made on the first day by the prosecutors to supply the accused with goods during the year, rather than
to the false pretences which had induced that contract.
If there is any sound distinction between goods directly obtained
by a false pretence and goods obtained under a contract into which
the seller has been entrapped by a false pretence, as was held in
Regina v. Gardner,Dearsley & Bell Cr. Cas. 40 (1856), but which
seems to be denied in 2 Wharton's Cr. Law, sect. 2124, a (7th ed.),
the distinction is of no moment here, because it is shown that in
the case at bar the accused was questioned over at the time of each
purchase, and each time repeated tlme false pretences. It is evident
from the testimony that unless he had done so he would not have
obtained the further supply of goods, and therefore their dealing
must be referred to the false pretences thus repeated, rather than
to the previous contract.
6. The second instruction asked for defendant was erroneous in
stating that the jury must believe that the false pretences alone induced the selling of the goods. It is sufficient if they formed a
constituent and material part of the inducement, even though other
considerations contributed also to the result, provided that without
them the credit would not have been extended: 2 Whart. Am. Cr.
Law, sect. 2121, and authorities: People v. Ha!/nei, 11 Wend.
559 ; 2 Bishop's Cr. Law, sect. 461, and authorities.
7. The fifth instruction asked for defendant declares that no
conviction can be had unless the pretence was such as would have
deceived, and was likely to have deceived, a man of ordinary prudence. No facts proven warranted such a charge, nor do we believe
the principle announced a sound one, though the authorities upon
it are conflicting. The btatute is made for the protection of the
weak and unsuspecting, as well as of the wary and cautious, and
the cheat who has defrauded his victim by a designed and fraudulent mis-statement as to an existing fact should not be allowed to
escape punishment upon the ground that care bnd prudence would
have protbctcd the party from its consequences.
See a discussion of the cases on this subject by lion. T. F. DAVIDSON, in 16
Am. Law Beg. N. S. 321, supporting the view above taken.-ED. Am. LAw REG.
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It may be, as said by some of the authorities, that where the
carelessness is so gross that the law will impute consent to the
seller, no guilt would be incurred: 2 Whart. Am. Cr. Law, sects.
2182-9-30-31 ; .oton v. Commonwealth, 11 Allen 266.
8. The tenth instruction asked by the defendant announces in
substance that no conviction can be had if a part of the statements
made were true and a part false, unless the jury believe from the
testimony that the goods were sold in reliance upon those which
were false, and without any reliance upon those which were true;
or, in other words, that the credit must have been extended upon
the faith of the false statements, unaffected and unaided by the true
one. The eleventh instruction declares that while the indictment
may be sustained by proof of the falsity of one only of several
statements, this is only so where the statements are of discork
nected, independent facts, and the false statement, thus independent
of and disconnected with the others, is exclusively relied upon in
the transfer of the goods. Neither of these instructions is supported by reason or well-reasoned decisions, though there are dicta
in the books which seem to lend some countenance to them. It is
rare that cheats content themselves with a single false statement
of an isolated fact, and still rarer, perhaps, that they fail to weave
some element of truth into their fraudulent devices. The tinge of
truth gives color and currency to the lie, and thereby more readily
entraps the person sought to be defrauded. It would be absurd to
say that the single truth should sanctify the falsehood, and thus
make the element which by its presence in such a connection was
most dangerous, save the falsifier from all punishment. It is
equally irrational to require that the falsehood should have been
as to a fact disconnected with the true statement, and that the
credit should have been based exclusively upon it. Though truth
and falsehood may be blended most cunningly together and both
combined may have induced the seller to part with his goods, yet
if it appears that but for the falsehood he would not have done so,
this is sufficient.
That the seller may in fact have acted upon both will not save
the accused if he would not have so acted but for the falsehood.
In other words, it is not necessary that the credit should have been
given solely or exclusively upon the false pretence, but only that
it should have been one of the material and controlling considerations, without which the goods would not have been sold. WherVOL. XXVI.-67
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ever the proof comes up to this requirement it can make no difference whether the falsehood is connected with the statement of a
fact partly true'or relates to one wholly false. It is to be remarked,
however, that in this case there was in fact no connection between
the statements as to the crop and those relating to the trading and
the indebtedness.
In his examination-in-chief, the seller of the goods testified that
he acted upon all the representations made, of which those relative
to the crop must, as we have seen, be left out of view. Being
asked, upon cross-examination, whether he would have sold the
goods upon the faith of the statement about the crops, even if he
had been told that the accused was in debt, he replied that this
would have depended upon the anount of the debts and the persons
to whom due. Counsel insist that this answer shows that he sold
in reliance upon the crops, and that the fact of indebtedness or
non-indebtedness was not material. On the contrary, it only shows
that the crop was a part of the inducement, and while it might of
itself have been sufficient to have procured the credit if the debts
had been small and not owing to merchants who would compete
with the prosecutors for the handling of the crop, it is manifest
that the false statement actually made as to the amount and character of the debts entered into the extension of credit. The same
may be said with reference to the false statement that the accused
was not trading elsewhere, which seems to have formed quite an
important factor in the matter, as indeed it usually does in transactions like this, and as to this no qualifying expressions were extracted from the witness.
We perceive no error in the record, wherefore the judgment is
affirmed.

